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Abstract— Thenumbers of the botnet attacks areincreasing 
day by day and the detection of botnet spreading in the 
network has become very challenging. Bots are having 
specific characteristics incomparison of normal malware as 
they are controlled by the remote master server and usually 
don’t show their behavior like normal malware until they 
don’t receive any command from their master server. Most 
of time bot malware are inactive, hence it isvery difficult to 
detect. Further the detection or tracking of the network of 
theses bots requires an infrastructure that should be able to 
collect the data from a diverse range of data sources and 
correlate the data to bring the bigger picture in view.In this 
paper, we are sharing our experience of botnet detection in 
the private network as well as in public zone by deploying 
the nepenthes honeypots. The automated framework for 
malware collection using nepenthes and analysis using anti-
virus scan are discussed.  The experimental results of botnet 
detection by enabling nepenthes honeypots in network are 
shown. Also we saw that existing known bots in our network 
can be detected.  
 
Index Terms—Malware, Bots, Network Security, Nepenthes, 
Honeypots, Privacy 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Botnet is becoming a major problem to internet as the 
size of cyber space is growing day by day. The 
applications running on the cyber space are becoming 
insecure and vulnerable to the attack generated by the 
black hat community. The motivation behind the attack 
can be to gain the access of the user‟s computer, to steal 
the information, to generate the DDoS attacks, to down 
the resources running in network. In last few years, the 
size of the network is increasing from low speed to 
gigabit network and the applications are also increasing 
day by day. In today‟s business oriented and 
heterogeneous network, security of the existing 
applications is extremely important. The flaws in security 
have become significant problems for private users, 
business, and even for government [1].  
A botnet is a system that remotely controls malicious 
programs running on compromised hosts. Botnets are 
now a major source of network threats including DDoS, 
spam, identity theft, click frauds, etc. [17-19]. Botnets are 
still rapidly proliferating and communicating using a 
variety of protocols, such as IRC, HTTP, peer-to-peer, 
etc. The cumulative size of botnets is estimated in 
millions of hosts [16][18-19]. Due to the huge number of 
botnets, and evolving botnet protocols, it appears difficult 
to block or remove (or both) all bots from the Internet. 
So, first start with minimum target to identify bots and 
their actions. 
The attacks by Black hat community are daily 
increasing on the applications running in the network to 
steal useful information or to gain access of the client 
machine. Malwares are spreading into the cyber space 
and bot is one of those kinds of malware which has 
special kind of characteristics and remotely controlled by 
the botmaster. By detecting the some set of attacks used 
by the black hat community, we would be able to tighten 
the security of these kinds of high speed network as well 
as applications running in these networks. 
As described in [16], bots are typically activated by bot 
commands through a communication and control channel 
(C&C) opened by attackers (i.e. botmasters) from remote 
sites. The bot commandsissued may be run by a group of 
bots in the botnetsimultaneously, as they have been 
programmed. The study of bot behavior in response to 
issued commands is important for the development of 
effective countermeasures, for tracing botnet growth, and 
for protecting the vulnerable infrastructure which are the 
target of bots.Also theidentification of victims targeted by 
botnets may also be facilitated by a thorough analysis of 
bot commands [15]. More information about the bots and 
virus could be found out in [3-5]. 
Botnet detection and tracking is one of the very active 
research areas since last few years. Different solutions 
and techniques have been proposed for the same. Our 
approach was based on honeypot [7-8] for the malware 
collection and automated analysis of collected malware. 
A proactive system design has been discussed in [14]. 
The nepenthes low interaction honeypotswas used instead 
of high interaction honeypots. There were two main 
reasons of using low interaction honeypots:- 
 
 They can be easily configured and installed. Also 
they are low resource intensive. 
 They are much faster than high interaction 
honeypots.  
 
So, with this consideration of honeypot technology, we 
could provide the attacker insight into our emulated 
network environment. Also we could monitor and log the 
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interaction between the attackers and honeypots which 
could be further studied and analysed for botnet 
detection.  
The system which was used to detect and analyse the 
attackers‟ action,was known as honeypot system. The 
honeypot has no intervention with the production traffic; 
therefore anything which comes on the honeypots is most 
likely the malicious intent. As compare to any other 
available security tools, honeypots are capable of logging 
much more information. They provide the vulnerable 
environment, to the attackers so that they can attack on 
the information system and can get access of the system.  
Every activity of the attacker would be being 
monitored and logged and could be analysed. To tighten 
the security into the network, the nepenthes were 
deployed as a low interaction honeypots to study the 
known bot families into the network. Virtualization 
technology VirtualBox
®
 [11] was used to reduce the 
involved hardware cost which is an open source 
virtualization product,which provides the flexible 
environment to set-up the network with single physical 
machine.  
 
 
 
 
Figure1.Classification of honeypots 
II. BACKGROUND ANDTECHNOLOGY USED 
A brief introduction of different technologies is 
following which were used in the project. 
A. Honeypot 
A network security resource whose value lies in it, 
being scanned,attacked,compromised, controlled and 
misused by an attacker to attain his malicious goals. 
Lance Spitzner defines Honeypots as “A Honeypot is an 
information system resource whose value lies in 
unauthorized or illicit use of that resource” [1]. 
Honeypots can be classified into two main categories. 
Firstly, they can be based upon their level of interaction 
with an attacker. This can be further categorized as 
discussed in [9] [16]. Figure 1 depicts the classification of 
the honeypots according to their level of interaction and 
as per their deployment in network. 
 
 
1) Low-interaction honeypots 
Low interaction provides emulated network services to 
the attackers. Honeyd [6] and Nepenthes [13] are the 
examples of these kinds of low interaction honeypots. In 
contrast with low interaction honeypots, high interaction 
honeypots provides complete freedom to attackers to 
interact with real operating system and services and their 
all attemptsare logged and accounted for. 
2) Production Honeypots:  
They are placed withinan organization‟s production 
network for thepurpose of detection. They extend the 
capabilitiesof intrusion detection systems. Such 
honeypotsare developed and configured to integrate with 
theorganization's infrastructure. They are 
usuallyimplemented as low-interaction honeypots 
sittingwithin the server farm, but implementations 
mayvary depending on requirements of the organization. 
3) Research Honeypots:  
These are deployed bynetwork security researchers – 
the White hat hackers. They allow complete freedom for 
theattacker andlearntheir tactics in this process. Using 
research honeypots zero dayexploits, Worms, Trojans and 
viruses which are propagatingin the network can be 
isolated and studied.Researchers can then document their 
findings andshare them with system programmers, with 
networkand system administrators, with various system 
andanti-virus vendors. They can provide the raw 
materialfor the rule engines of IDS, IPS and 
firewallsystems. 
B. Botnet 
A „Bot‟ has special characteristics as compare to the 
normal malwares. They are maintained and controlled by 
the remote servers know as botmastes. The collection of 
computers infected with such bot malwares are known as 
botnet. Therefore botnet is a network of zombies 
(infected computers) which are controlled by the 
botmaster. Normally bot malwares are inactive and get 
the command from the remote server (C&C). The 
commands are being executed by the bot client when it is 
given by the C&C servers.  Bot masters control the botnet 
through a command and controlmechanism. The 
formation of botnet is like C&Cservers often 
communicate with other C&C servers to achieve the 
redundancy.  
The topology of a botnetevolved over time from 
simple star to complex random combination of different 
topologies.Botnets are often classified according to the 
protocol through which it sends out commands tothe 
zombie computers. A typical classification is as [2]: 
 
 IRC Botnet: Bot masters acts as IRC servers 
and uses IRC channels to send commands 
tothe botnet. All of the members of the botnet 
are connected to the channel. Commands 
arepassed as a broadcast to the participants 
using the common IRC protocol. 
 HTTP Botnet: Bot master acts as a web server 
and bots are connected to the web 
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server.Commands are encapsulated in HTTP 
messages. 
 P2P Botnet: Newer breed of botnet that uses 
existing P2P protocols to distributecommands. 
This kind of botnet is harder to detect 
compared to the other botnets. 
 
The bots are connected to the botnet through a C&C 
channel as mentioned above. A C&Cchannel can operate 
on different network topologies and communication 
mechanisms. The mostcommon protocol used for this is 
the IRC protocol. The main reasons why IRC is so 
popular are [12]: 
 
 Interactive- the full two way communication 
between the server and the client ispossible. 
 Easy to install-setting up private servers or 
using existing ones are easy. 
 Easy to control-using credentials such as 
username, passwords and channels; all 
theneeded functionalities already exist in the 
IRC protocol. 
 Redundancy possibilities- by linking several 
servers together, one server can godown while 
the botnet is still functioning by connecting to 
other IRC servers. 
 
There alsoa botnet that uses the HTTP protocol for 
C&C. HTTP based C&C is stillcentralized, but the 
botmaster does not directly interact with the bots using 
chat likemechanisms. Instead, the bots periodically 
contact the C&C servers to obtain theircommands. As its 
proven effectiveness and efficiencies, it is expected that 
centralized C&C (e.g. using IRC and HTTP) will still be 
widely used by botnets in near future. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.System Architecture 
 
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE  
The nepenthes deployment architecture is discussed for 
malware collection and automated analysis using anti-
virus scan. Nepenthes [13][15] are low interaction 
honeypots widely used for malware collection. Nepenthes 
as low interaction honeypot with default set of 
vulnerabilities which can be deployed in production 
network and can be useful to generate the alerts to system 
administrator who can take the necessary actions to 
tighten the security of the network. We enabledthe 
nepenthes low interaction sensors in enterprise network 
and make them active all the time. We have deployed the 
nepenthes sensors in public network zone at various 
geographical locations as well as in private LAN to 
collect worms spreading in local private network [10]. 
 Figure 2 show the system architecture including 
nepenthes and automated analysis of malwares using 
virus scan. As depicted in the Figure, there are nepenthes 
sensors used for malware collection. Basically there are 
three major components of the system: Malware 
collector, Virus scan server and Log server.  
 
a) Malware Collector 
As shown in the Figure 2, the low interaction 
honeypot (nepenthes) was used for malware collection. 
This is discussed how a particular low-interaction 
honeypot (nepenthes) [13] could be used to quickly alert 
an administrator about a network compromise. It captures 
malware and can assist in containing and removing the 
infection. 
 
b) Nepenthes Sensors 
For the implementation of nepenthes sensors 
VirtualBox
®
 [11] was used. By using virtualization, it 
will reduce the hardware cost as compare to real physical 
system as well as will improve the deployment and 
maintenance. 
 
Various Modules in Nepenthes  
 Vulnerability Modules – emulates various 
services which look ripe for compromise to an 
attacker (lsass, dcom, veritas, dameware, etc) 
 Shellcode Handlers and Emulators – allows 
nepenthes to interact with the malware 
 Download Modules – will download the binary 
(http, ftp, curl, etc) 
 Submission Modules – will submit the binary for 
analysis (Norman, CWSandbox, postgres, etc) 
 
c) Log server 
Malware collected and all the data sets including 
network traces, pcap data were stored in log server for 
further analysis of the collected data. Log server is a 
central database server which keeps the metadata of the 
collected information.  It keeps the following records:  
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 MD5 values of the malware samples 
 Malware Binaries 
 Pcap data & network traces 
 Analysis results including antivirus labels etc 
 IP address information 
 Logs of the download, submitted binaries 
 Malware binaries stored in log servers were fetched 
and submitted to the analysis server where further 
analysis of the corresponding binary was done and result 
logs were putted into log server. 
d) Anti-Virus Scan:  
The malware binaries were fetched from log server 
and automatically submitted to anti-virus scan server 
which was doing the analysis of the binary based on 
predefined signatures. For this purpose three antivirus 
softwarewere chosen from different 
companiesMacAfee
®
, Symantec
®
 and Microsoft
®
. Also 
the MD5 of the corresponding binarywas submitted to 
theVirus Total [15] for scan with 42 anti-virus products. 
Virus Total is a free online service that enables Internet 
users to scan dubious files with 42 different antivirus 
(AV) tools. 
The functionality of the system is as the following: 
the user sends a file to the system, via email or the web 
interface. He would get a report back when all AV tools 
will have finished examining the submitted file. That 
report includes the output of each engine, URLs with 
extra information about the potential threat if any. It gives 
information about file metadata size, various hashes of 
the file etc. It can also contain packet identification or the 
Portable Executable (PE) structure information of the 
malware. Virus Total with its 42 AV engines, offers a 
valuable service not only to the end users but also to the 
community of the AV vendors. Indeed, Virus Total can 
provide them with samples of malware that match certain 
criteria of interest to them. In the general case Virus Total 
sends a malware sample to AV vendor X then the 
following would be done: 
 
•  If at least one other AV engine has detected the 
sample as being malicious whereas the AV 
engine of X has not. 
•  If the AV engine from X has detected that 
sample as being malicious using a generic 
pattern or a heuristic. 
 
Most AV vendors follow these two rules but some of 
them impose other criteria also. For instance, some have 
decided to get samples that are detected by at least N out 
of K AV engines and that their own has missed. Others 
do restrict even further the conditions by imposing that all 
engines from a well-defined subset of engines must have 
detected the sample and that their own has missed it [13]. 
Clearly the amount of samples to be sent to the AV 
vendors is a function of the filtering rules they have 
chosen. It is worth noting though that, in the general case, 
some vendors do get as many as 10000 samples per day 
[15].However this kind of malware collection mechanism 
may incur more cost and require complete collaboration 
with antivirus vendors in terms of services. This solution 
would be good for large organization, individual 
researchers, small organization, and private partners. 
The complete process of malware collection and 
their analysis can be represented in following way:  
 
1. If the nepenthes honeypots are deployed in 
public network zone, then there is central 
malware collection repository of the malware.  
2. If the nepenthes honeypots are deployed in 
private network then there is local malware 
repository and analysis server 
 
The system is working on 3 layer architecture. 
Layer 1 incorporates nepenthes honeypot sensors which 
captures the malware samples and sends data to the 
central server on a regular basis. Layer2 incorporates 
central server which performs activities like registering 
new nepenthes nodes, processing data sent by remote 
nodes by fusing the data with the configuration 
information of honeypots and converting the data in to a 
relational data base format. Layer 3 consist the database 
which acts as a data source for analysis engine. Figure 3 
depicts the complete flow and deployment of the system.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.Complete Flow of the System 
IV EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Here we are presenting some results of our 
nepenthes based system as malware collector and analysis 
mechanism. We have implemented our mentioned system 
on 1/1/2011 and collected very valuable information and 
malwares. We have collected real bots which were 
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damaging the computers in network. During this period 
of deployment total 732 numbers of samples were 
collected and we are containing large amount of PCAP 
data which is highly malicious in nature. Continuously 
we are submitting the data to our centre response team 
which are taking the remedial actions against the 
collected data sets and corresponding IP or attackers. 
Below Figure 4 illustrates the top 10 countries from 
where we have collected most our data sets. 
 
 
 
 
Figures 4.Top 10 alerts from different countries 
 
Below TableIshow the top 10 most accessed URLs 
by deploying the nepenthes sensors geographically. 
Column 1 in Tablerepresent the URLs accessed and 
column 2 represent the hit count of the corresponding 
URL. As shown in Table the hit count of the 
www.x.x.x.de/M.txt is 191 which are highest among 
others. For security concern, we have changed the name 
of the URLs.  
TABLE I.   
MOST ACCESSED URLS 
URL Count 
http://www.x.x.x.de/M.txt 191 
tftp://x.x.x.x/host.exe 97 
http://y.net/fastenv 39 
http://nmap.org/book/nse.html 24 
http://y.proxyfire.net/fastenv 19 
http://XX.63.156.12:8326/lsd 18 
http://www.a.a.com 17 
http://XXX.109.153.3/proxycheck.txt 15 
http://XXX.109.153.5:11111 15 
tftp://XXX.100.78.32/host.exe 14 
 
 
TableII shows the top 10 MD5 values and their 
labelling corresponding to anti-virus scan. Column 1 
represents the MD5 value of the collected malware 
binary, column 2 depicts hit count, and column 3, 4 and 5 
depicts the antivirus labelling corresponding to 
MacAfee
®
, Microsoft
®
and Symantec
®
 antivirus products. 
As we can see most of them are declared as IRC 
W32.IRC bot malwares. When we have submitted MD5 
of that binary to Virus Total for scanning with 42 
antivirus products, they were really the IRC bots and 
most of the antivirus products declaring them as IRC 
bots. So our deployed our automated system easily 
detected the bots spreading in the network and tighten the 
security against these bots.  
TABLE II.   
TOP 10 MD5 VALUES & THEIR LABELLING 
MD5 Count MacAfee Microsoft Symantec 
8659156
50a85e7
c27cdd1
1850a13
f86e 
51 W32/Sdb
ot.worm.
gen.bs 
BackdoorWin32
/Rbot 
W32.IRCB
ot 
809fe9b
32845ed
f5c09b8
71e0e68
f227 
63 W32/Sdb
ot.worm.
gen.bs 
BackdoorWin32
/Rbot 
W32.IRCB
ot 
0da155b
04f16daf
afffbb1a
485b3d0
e1 
27 W32/Sdb
ot.worm.
gen.bs 
BackdoorWin32
/Rbot 
W32.IRCB
ot 
6e2fa90
31a05b9
649da06
2c550d1
4a3d 
40 W32/Sdb
ot.worm.
gen.bs 
BackdoorWin32
/Rbot 
W32.IRCB
ot 
f9dc394
5bdd740
6bd8db0
6a47963
ec14 
67 W32/Sdb
ot.worm.
gen.bs 
BackdoorWin32
/Agent 
 
8a5ce07
df6a535
7dafa84f
5317aaa
d35 
75 W32/Sdb
ot.worm.
gen.bs 
BackdoorWin32
/Rbot 
W32.IRCB
ot 
9019b23
f2a5a51c
3367173
9af2f309
92 
32 W32/Sdb
ot.worm.
gen.bs 
BackdoorWin32
/Rbot 
W32.IRCB
ot 
15965bb
88165d1
eb06851
d8f0761
30ba 
31 W32/Sdb
ot.worm.
gen.bs 
BackdoorWin32
/Rbot 
W32.IRCB
ot 
 
 
Also Figure 5 shows the daily collection graph by 
our system since its deploying date. 
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Figure5. Nepenthes Binaries Daily Collection 
 
Some results of logs generated on the nepenthes 
honeypots are shown below when deployed with public 
IPs. Nepenthes honeypot IP address was 203.x.x.x and 
others were the foreign outside IP addresses. As we can 
see there is binary download ftp andtftp protocol. These 
results signify the interaction of the outside IP address 
with nepenthes as honeypots don‟t have any production 
values which clarify that they are malicious IP addresses. 
For security reason we have omitted the real IP address.  
 
[2011-05-27T15:53:16] 66.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x creceive://66.x.x.x:9988/0 
[2011-05-27T16:56:59] 59.x.x.x -> 
203.129.220.217 
creceive://59.x.x.x:9988/0 
[2011-05-28T04:57:15] 83.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x creceive://83.x.x.x:9988/0 
[2011-05-28T12:03:57] 203.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x 
tftp://203.111.222.65/host.exe 
[2011-05-28T16:26:30] 203.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x tftp://203.x.x.x/host.exe 
[2011-05-28T21:21:11] 60.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x creceive://60.x.x.x:9988/0 
[2011-05-29T02:52:18] 203.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x 
ftp://1:1@203.x.x.x:12405/host.exe 
[2011-05-29T06:34:37] 203.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x tftp://203.x.x.x/host.exe 
[2011-05-29T08:53:48] 209.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x creceive://209.x.x.x:9988/0 
[2011-05-30T01:08:45] 174.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x creceive://174.x.x.x:9988/0 
[2011-05-30T02:54:41] 125.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x http://www.baidu.com/ 
[2011-05-30T06:28:48] 203.x.x.x -> 
203.x.x.x tftp://203.x.x.x/host.exe 
[2011-05-30T06:47:21] 203.x.x.x -> 
203.129.220.217 
ftp://1:1@203.180.24.32:18807/host.exe 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have presented anautomated system 
based on nepenthes as malware collector and analysis of 
them using antivirus scan. This is one step of detecting 
the known bots in the network and in any organization we 
can detect the bot spreading in the network using this 
system. Further we have also shown the behavior based 
analysis of the collected malwares which are not detected 
by the antivirus products. The claim is that all the 
software (OS and associated tools) are Open Source. A 
low-interaction honeypot like nepenthes is easy to install 
and requires minimal maintenance.It may provide 
valuable information in the event of an infection within 
your organization. Whenused in conjunction with an 
Intrusion Detection System, valuable information about 
thebehavior of the malware, packet captures and the 
malware binary itself may be obtained. 
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